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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
U-M INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE V. RAY and PHEBE RAY, 
his wife; JAY c. HANSEN and 
ARDELLE H. HANSEN, his wife; 
BARRY RANDALL and DEMA RANDALL, 
his wife; FRED BERGSTROM and 
CONNIE BERGSTROM, his wife; 
BOWARD THORLEY and TREVA PEG 
TBORLEY, his wife; w. GARY 
RINEHART and GENEVIEVE v. 
RINEHART, his wife; LAWRENCE 
D. LAWLOR and BARBARA J. 
LAWLOR, his wife; TERREL L. 
BIRD and JANET L. BIRD, his 
wife, 
Defendants. 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE AND 
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, DOUGLAS w. CHURCH 
and FRANKLIN H. BUTTERFIELD, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
TERRELL L. BIRD and JANET 
L. BIRD, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
HOSS A. RAY and PERRY RAY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19121 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover a judgment against two 
sureties on a supersedeas bond. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed appellants' motion for 
judgment against the sureties, holding in effect that the 
supersedeas bond did not cover the face amount of the 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the ruling of the trial 
court. The case should be remanded with instructions to 
enter judgment against the sureties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After the trial and retrial of a very complex case 
involving numerous parties and issues, appellants Terrel L. 
Bird and Janet L. Bird (hereinafter referred to as "Birds") 
obtained a judgment against defendants, Dale V. Ray, Fred 
Bergstrom and others, in the amount of $128,500.00 plus 
interest (R-1, Page 7; R-2, Page 7). 
Ray and Bergstrom appealed the District Court judgment 
to the Utah Supreme Court, and the appeal was eventually 
dismissed. U.M. Investments v. Ray, et al. (Utah 1982), 
658 P.2d 1186. 
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In order to prevent Birds from executing on the judgment 
while the appeal was pending, Ray and Bergstrom posted a 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $128,500.00, being the 
exact amount of the judgment (R-4).1 The sureties on the 
bond were Ross A. Ray and Perry Ray. 
After the appeal was dismissed, Birds moved in accord-
ance with Rule 73(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and in 
accordance with the terms of the supersedeas bond for judg-
ment against the sureties (R-5). The sureties, Ross and 
Perry Ray, resisted the motion, and after hearing arguments 
and reviewing briefs submitted by the parties, the trial 
court dismissed Birds' motion for judgment (R-9).2 The 
trial court in effect ruled that the supersedeas bond covered 
costs and damages but not the face amount of the judgment. 
Although there were numerous parties to the original 
action, the issues on appeal relate solely to appellants Bird 
and the sureties Ross and Perry Ray. 
1 The complete supersedeas bond is reproduced at Appen-
dix I of this brief. 
2 Rule 73(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for 
enforcement against the sureties on motion, without the 
necessity of an independent action. An order denying motion 
for judgment on an appeal bond is an appealable order. 
Merritt v. J. A. Stafford Company, 440 p;2d 927 (Cal. 1968). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND WAS INTENDED TO COVER 
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
The extent of liability under a supersedeas bond must be 
determined in accordance with the real or the presumed inten-
tion of the parties. Aviation Credit Corporation v. Conner 
Airlines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1962), 307 F.2d 685. Under the 
language of the supersedeas bond in the instant case, the 
sureties promise that the appellants will pay all damages and 
costs which may be awarded on appeal or on a dismissal there-
of, not exceeding $128,500.00, plus interest at 12% from the 
date of judgment. Although the language of the bond is 
stated in terms of damages, rather than payment of the judg-
ment, it is Birds' position that the clear intention of the 
parties was to cover the judgment amount. The supersedeas 
bond taken as a whole, the statutory requirements relating to 
said bonds, the very purpose of the bond, and all of the sur-
rounding circumstances clearly support such an intention. 
Specifically, the factors evidencing the intent of the par-
ties are as follows: 
1. Statutory Requirements. Rule 73(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides that whenever a stay on appeal is 
desired, the appellant shall present a supersedeas bond. The 
- 3 -
cule provides: 3 
"The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction 
of the judgment in full, together with costs, in-
terest, and damages for delay, if for any reason 
the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is 
affirmed 
When the judgment is for the recovery of money not 
otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be 
fixed at such sum as will cover the whole aiiiOiiilt of 
the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on appeal, 
interest, and damages for delay, unless the court 
after notice and hearing and for good cause shown 
fixes a different amount • • 
Thus, it is clear from the rule, that unless the Court after 
notice and hearing fixes a different amount, a supersedeas 
bond must be conditioned upon the satisfaction of the 
judgment in full. It would be unreasonable to presume that 
the parties intended to execute and file a bond that 
materially varied from the statutory requirements. 
Generally, parties are presumed to be contracting under 
existing law, and every contract impliedly contains the laws 
existing at the time. Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commisson, 583 P.2d 53 (Otah 1978); Quagliana v. 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Otah 1975). 
2. Amount of-the Bond. The amount of the supersedeas 
bond is the exact amount of the judgment - $128,500.00, 
plus interest at 12% from the date of the judgment. That 
dmnunt, including the interest, is mentioned both in the 
3 The applicable rules in their entirety are reproduced at 
Appendix II of this brief. 
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recitation clause and the undertaking clause of the super-
sedeas bond. Two references to this exact amount in such a 
short document are not merely coincidental, but are indica-
tive of the intention of the parties. The fact that the 
judgment amount and the bond amount are identical is strongly 
indicative that the sureties intended to be bound for the 
payment of the judgment. 
3. Existence of Separate Cost Bond. It is important to 
note that the appellants posted a $300.00 cost bond under 
Rule 73(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the 
$128,500.00 supersedeas bond (R-3). The fact that two 
separate bonds were filed is further indication that the 
parties intended the supersedeas bond to in fact be a 
supersedeas bond and not something less. 
4. Purpose of the Supersedeas Bond. It is elementary 
that the whole purpose of a supersedeas bond is to secure the 
prevailing party. At 9 Moore's Federal Practice §208.06(2) 
(2d. Ed. 57) it is stated as follows: 
RThe conditions of the supersedeas bond follow from 
the nature of the bond itself. The purpose for re-
quiring a bond is to secure the prevailing party 
against any loss that he may sustain as a result of 
an ineffectual appeal". 
Contracts are to be construed in such manner as to give 
effect to the purpose which the parties sought to accom-
plish. Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976). If the 
supersedeas bond is construed as respondents would contend, 
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the entire purpose would be frustrated. In fact, the bond 
would become meaningless and worthless to the prevailing 
party. 
5. Construction Against Party Using Words. The super-
sedeas bond was filed by the original appellants and their 
sureties. Birds had nothing to do with the preparation of 
the bond. As stated in Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, 
Inc. 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976), it is the policy of the law 
to look with disfavor upon semi-concealed or obscure self 
protecting provisions in a document prepared by one party, 
which the other party is not likely to notice. Any uncer-
tainties or ambiguities are to be resolved against the party 
drawing it. Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1975); Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest Realty and Finance Com-
554. P.2d 882 (Utah 1975). 
6. Title. The document filed with the court is titled 
"supersedeas bond". The title itself is an indication of the 
parties intent. If the instrument is construed in accordance 
with the contention of the respondents, then the instrument 
is simply not a supersedeas bond as that term is used in Rule 
73(d). The appellants and sureties called the document a 
supersedeas bond; Birds relied upon it as being a supersedeas 
bond; and this Court ought to construe it as a supersedeas 
bond. It has been held that the sureties on a superdeas bond 
are estopped from denying the recitals contained in the bond. 
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Pratt v. Gilbert, 8 Utah 54; 29 Pac. 965 (1892). They like-
wise should be estopped from claiming that it is something 
other than what is represented by its title. 
7. Fraud Upon the Court and Parties. If the language 
of the supersedeas bond was deliberately framed so as to 
exclude the judgment from the undertaking under the bond, 
then such conduct would seem to approach fraud upon the Court 
and the parties. If such were the case, the sureties would 
have deliberately filed a bond that was not in compliance 
with the statutes; would have called it something that it 
wasn't; would have used numerical figures to mislead the par-
ties; and would have filed an illusionary instrument. Cer-
tainly if such were the case, the sureties should not now be 
permitted to benefit from such conduct. Birds do not ser-
iously contend that the parties committed a fraud. Rather, 
they urge that it was always the clear intention of the 
sureties to be bound upon the supersedeas bond in the 
customary manner. It would be unreasonable to interpret the 
language of the bond in such a way as to imply a fraud. 
8. Damages. Under the language of the bond, the sure-
ties undertake to pay all "damages" awarded against the 
appellants on appeal. It is again important to note that the 
bond language is not "damages for delay" as that term is used 
in Rule 73(d), but is an unrestricted use of the word 
"damages". In the broad sense, the term damages covers any 
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compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in 
the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment or 
injury. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 466 (4th Ed. 1951). 
Therefore the amount of the judgment awarded to Birds does 
represent damages suffered by them. The term damages can 
easily be construed to include the judgment. Looking at the 
supersedeas bond as a whole, would compel such a construc-
tion. 4 
9. Interest. If the supersedeas bond was not intended 
to cover the judgment, why would it provide for the sureties 
to pay interest at the judgment rate, and from the date of 
judgment? If the damages were something different from the 
judgment, there would be no logic at all in backcharging in-
terest on the damages to the date of the judgment. The 
answer is obvious. The whole intention of the parties was to 
bond for payment of the judgment, and the interest provision 
dovetails with that intention. 
When all of the above factors are considered together, 
the intention of the parties becomes crystal clear. The 
supersedeas bond was intended to cover the face amount of the 
iudgment plus interest. Any other interpretation would do 
·1iolence to the language of the instrument, the requirements 
uf the statute, and the purpose sought to be accomplished. 
4 For further authorities, see Page 9, supra. 
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The sureties cited to the lower court, and will undoubt-
edly cite to this Court, cases from other jurisdictions to 
the effect that bonds must be strictly construed. Some of 
the cases do in fact hold that a bond which is not specifi-
cally by its terms conditioned for the payment or satisfac-
tion of the judgment but for the payment of costs and damages 
cannot by contruction be given that effect. The authorities 
covering this issue are annotated at 124 A.L.R. 501.5 The 
authorities cited in the annotation, however, are by no means 
uniform. The majority of state cases mentioned in the 
annotation6 hold that the bond cannot be construed to 
extend to the judgment (although many of cases deal with 
appeal bonds not operating as a supersedeas). The majority 
of the federal cases, and a minority of the state cases cited 
in the annotation squarely hold that an appeal bond, although 
in terms not conditioned for the payment of the judgment, but 
for the payment of all costs and damages, may be construed to 
have that effect, particularly where it is a supersedeas bond 
and the appeal is made to operate as a supersedeas on the 
judgment. No Utah cases are shown in the annotation. The 
annotation further cites a controlling principle as follows 
5 124 A.L.R. 501. "Condition of bond on appeal not in terms 
covering payment of money judgment, as having that effect by 
implication or construction." 
6 At 5 AM. JUR.2d, Appeal and Error §1054, this now appears 
to be cited as a minority position. 
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rPage 501): 
"This rule (of strict construction) does not imply that 
a strained construction is to be put on the words of 
a bond in favor of the surety. The rule of strict 
construction, as applied to contracts of suretyship and 
guarantors, in no way interferes with the use of the 
ordinary tests by which the actual meaning and 
intention of contracting parties are ordinarily 
determined". 
The issue before the Court in the instant case involves the 
construction of a specific and a unique instrument. The 
facts are not similar to any authority cited by the sureties. 
None of the cases upon which they rely involve a situation 
where the statute requires that the bond be conditioned upon 
payment of the judgment; where the bond is in fact given for 
the exact amount of the judgment; where the instrument is 
designated by its title as a supersedeas bond; where a simul-
taneous separate cost bond is given; and where interest under 
the bond specifically is tied to the judgment date. Here, 
the intention of the parties was clear, and the Court should 
so determine in accordance with the ordinary rules for con-
struction of written contracts. 
POINT II 
A SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS EFFECTIVE UPON DELIVERY 
Counsel for the sureties argued to the lower court that 
a supersedeas bond is not effective at all until approved by 
the rourt.7 Here, neither the sureties nor their principal 
7 Rule 62(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
a stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the Court. 
- 10 -
sought nor obtained court approval. They simply filed the 
bond to obtain the stay. Birds made no objection to the sure-
ties under Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; did not 
challenge the bond for lack of Court approval; and made no 
attempt to execute upon the judgment during the appeal. 
Although Birds could have made a technical challenge, they 
chose not to do so and relied upon the bond. There is noth-
ing whatsoever in either Rule 73 or Rule 62, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which states or implies that under such cir-
cumstances a duly executed and filed supersedeas bond becomes 
ineffective. Indeed, it seems rather surprising that the 
sureties would seriously urge the Court to be relieved from a 
solemn bond because of the failure to do something which 
either they or their principals were required to do to per-
feet the stay. 
In any event, the law is clear that sureties on a bond 
become legally liable even if a bond is insufficient to 
effect a stay of execution. This principle is discussed at 
length in Merritt v. J. A. Stafford Company, 440 P.2d 927 
(Cal. 1968) where the Court states as follows: 
•rt has been held that undertakings may be en-
forced although not in exact conformity with 
the statute, that the defect may be waived, that 
the obligor is in no position to complain that 
his obligation is less onerous than that pro-
vided for by statute, and that, where the 
appellant has the benefit of the bond, the 
obligor may not rely upon the fact that the 
respondent could but did not object to the 
sufficiency of the bond (authorities cited)." 
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See also the annotation at 120 A.L.R. 1062, where it is 
stated as follows: 
"The sureties generally are held liable on a super-
sedeas or appeal bond, although it was legally in-
sufficient to effect a stay of proceedings, as 
a matter of fact there was in effect a stay, no 
execution being issued, nor any attempt made to 
collect an execution if issued, or to enforce the 
judgment". 
More than 50 cases are cited for the above statement. The 
annotation also points out that the receipt of the bond 
itself furnishes a sufficient consideration for its 
enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited 
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of 
dismissal be reversed and the trial court directed to enter 
judgment against the sureties. The intention of the parties 
was clear, and the supersedeas bond should be construed to 
obligate the sureties for the payment of the judgment. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
APPENDIX I 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
PARK, BRAITHWAITE & EVES 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
Ray, Hansen, Randall and Bergstrom 
110 North Main Street, Suite H 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: 586-6532 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAB 
0-M INVESTMENTS, a Otllh, 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DALE V. RAY and PHEBE RAY: ) 
JAY C. HANSEN and ARDELLE H. ) 
HANSEN: BARRY RANDALL and ) 
DEMA RANDALL: FRED BERGSTROM ) 
and CONNIE BERGSTROM; HOWARD ) 
THORLEY and TREVA PEG THORLEY) 
w. GARY RINEHART and GENEVIVE) 
RINEHART: LAWRENCE D. LAWLOR ) 
and BARBARA J. LAWLOR; TERREL) 
L. BIRD and JANET L. BIRD, ). 
Defendanta, 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE AND 
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation and FRANltLIN 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Third-Party 
Oefendanta. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
H. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SllPERSEDEAS BOND 
caae No. 18216 
WHEREAS, defendanta/appellanta Ray, Hansen, 
Randall and Bergstrom have appealed to the Supreme court 
of the State of Otah from a Judgment dAted the 2lat day of 
December, 1981 in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and 
for Iron County, State of Utah (entitled aa above, Civil 
No. 7563) in favor of defendants Terrel L. Bird and Janet 
··' 
L. Bird for the total swn of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) with interest 
thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12') per annum from 
December 29, 1981. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises 
and of such appeal, the underaiqned, ROSS A. RAY and 
PERRY RAY 
does hereby undertake and promise, on the part of 
appellants, that said appellants will pay all damages and 
costs which may be awarded against it on the appeal or on 
a dismissal thereof, not exceeding, ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HllNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00), 
with interest thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12\) 
per annum from December 29, 1981, to which amount the 
ROSS A. RAY and undersigned 
itaelf 
bound. 
The undersigned, ROSS A. RAY and 
itself to the jurisdiction of the Fifth Judicial District 
Court of Iron County, State of Utah and irrevocably 
appoints the Clerk of said court as its agent, upon whom 
any paper• affecting it• liability, if any, may be 
enforced on·motion without th• neceaaity of an independent 
action. 
DATED this 
APPENDIX II 
(c) Bond on Appeal. At the lime of filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall file with such notice a bond for costs 
on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the adverse 
party, or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed. 
The bond shall be in the sum of $300.00 unless a supersedeas 
bond is filed, in which event no separate bond on appeal is re· 
quired. The bond on appeal shall be with sufficient sureties and 
shall be conditioned lo secure the payment of costs if the appeal 
is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the 
appellate court may award if the judgment is modified. The 
adverse party may except lo the sufficiency of the sureties in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i). If the appellant 
makes and files with the clerk of the court from which the appeal 
is taken, an affidavit in the form set out in section 21-7-3, Utah 
Code Annotated !953, no bond on appeal shall be required. 
(d) Supcrsedeas Bond. Whenever an appellant entitled there· 
lo desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the court for its 
approval a supersedeas bond which shall have such surety or 
sureties :is the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned for 
the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, 
interest, and for delay, if for any reason the appeal is 
dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full 
such modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and 
damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award. When 
the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, 
the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover 
the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs 
on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay, unless the court 
after notice and hearing and for good cause shown fixes a different 
amount or orders security other than the bond. When the judg-
ment determines the disposition of the properly in controversy as 
in real actions, replevin, and actions lo foreclose mortgages or 
when such property is in the custody of the sheriff or when the 
proceeds of such property or a bond for its value is in the custody 
or control of the court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall 
I.Jc fixed at such sum only as will secure the amount recovered 
for the use and detention of the property, the costs of the action, 
costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay. 
(e) Failure to File or Insufficiency of Bond. If a bond on 
appeal or a supersedeas bond is not filed within the time specified, 
or if the bond filed is found insufficient, and if the record on 
appeal has not been filed in the Supreme Court, a bond may be 
filed al such time before the record is so filed as may be fixed 
by the district court. After the record is so filed, application for 
leave lo file a bond may be made only in the Supreme Court. 
(f) Judgment Against Surety. The bond or undertaking given 
pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d) of the Rule, shall, in addition 
lo other requirements, provide that each surety submits himself 
to the jurisdiction of the district court and irrevocably appoints 
the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting 
his liability on the bond may be served, anc: that his liability may 
be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent 
action. The motion and such notice of the motions as the court 
prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forth· 
with mail copies to the surety if his address is known. 
